Party system rationalisation and the mirror image of interparty and intraparty competition: The adoption of party lists in Colombia
Co-authored with Matthew S. Shugart
Abstract
We analyze the adoption of a party-list electoral system in Colombia, replacing a former highly ‘personalised’ system (in which seats were allocated solely on candidate votes). Consistent with theoretical expectations, there were two major changes. First, the party system was ‘rationalised’: the number of parties competing is now more consistent across
districts. Formerly one-party dominant districts now feature interparty competition, and districts that formerly had numerous tiny parties now have fewer parties. Second, changes in the intraparty dimension ‘mirror’ those on the interparty dimension: where interparty competition increased, intraparty competition decreased, and vice versa. The results are
important to both practical reform efforts and furthering knowledge on the effects of electoral systems and their reform.
Integration and Cooptation: Presidential Patronage and Coalition Building in Colombia, 1968 to 1991
Coauthored with Royce Carroll, delivered at SPSA 2007
Abstract
Prior to Colombia’s 1991 reforms, the President possessed the ability to name sitting congressmen not only as ministers, but as ambassadors or even governors. Legislators were not required to resign but rather could take an indefinite “leave of absence”, leaving their suplente to serve on their behalf. Literature on presidential cabinet formation has emphasized the use of ministerial appointments to distribute policy influence and executive perks in exchange for legislative support. In this paper, we analyze cabinet appointments in Colombia during the period 1966 – 1990 and extend the analysis to ambassadorships and governorships. We compare career patterns with regard to the chamber of origin and destination of executive appointments and demonstrate their use as both a reward for electoral loyalty and inducement for legislative support.
Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The effects of the 1991 Constitution (2005),
Co-authored with Mauricio Cardenas and Roberto Junguito, IDB working paper (Published in 2008)
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to understand how changes in the political institutions established in the 1991 Constitution affected policy formulation and policy outcomes for the case of Colombia. According to our analysis, the central implication of the reform is that the president lost significant capacity as an agenda setter. In contrast, Congress, the Constitutional Court, and the board of the central bank have gained relative power. As a consequence, political transaction costs for the executive increased in several policy areas: macro-economic policy and fiscal policy. To illustrate the generalized decline in the president’s legislative success, we constructed an original database covering the period previous and after the reform, with a sample of four legislative years before the reform, and all bills introduced in the House of Representatives after 1992.
Explaining the Performance of the Colombian Congress: Electoral and legislative Rules, and Interactions with the Executive, 1991-2000 (2002)
M.Phil dissertation at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, Short version presented at LASA.
The aim of this paper is to show how Congress was organized internally and to explore what explained the Committees and legislators’ behaviour in the period 1994-2001. Former research on the Colombian Congress has been mainly focused on the effect of electoral rules on the Congress’ performance. Those studies did not take into account the effects of internal rules and the power of the executive. This paper will prove that these variables are important for understanding what the current situation of Congress is.
Additionally, the objective of this research is to analyze how the institutional framework governing the Colombian Congress affects both the behaviour of legislators and the way parties are organized. Examinations of Colombian legislative performance have usually focused on the features of the electoral system and the weaknesses of party discipline. From the electoral rules, studies have concluded that although the Colombian President has important constitutional powers, it is impossible to overcome the deadlocks generated by a system that promotes intra-party and inter-party competition. However, the Colombian Congress’s performance shows a certain level of organization and even efficiency in passing bills and getting through the legislative agenda. How can we explain this paradox? My proposal is that by taking into account the electoral rules, the internal rules of Congress and the power of the executive branch in imposing its preferences both in procedural and substantive matters, one can solve the paradox of the Congress performance and policy outcomes.
The period analysed, 1994-2000, covers two presidential periods after the Constitutional reform of 1991, and will contemplate both behaviour towards policy outcomes and procedural matters that account for the three main variables – the electoral rules, the internal rules of Congress and the resulting power from the executive- that account for the committees’ and legislators’ behaviour in the Colombian Congress.
The aim of this paper is to show how Congress was organized internally and to explore what explained the Committees and legislators’ behaviour in the period 1994-2001. Former research on the Colombian Congress has been mainly focused on the effect of electoral rules on the Congress’ performance. Those studies did not take into account the effects of internal rules and the power of the executive. This paper will prove that these variables are important for understanding what the current situation of Congress is.
Additionally, the objective of this research is to analyze how the institutional framework governing the Colombian Congress affects both the behaviour of legislators and the way parties are organized. Examinations of Colombian legislative performance have usually focused on the features of the electoral system and the weaknesses of party discipline. From the electoral rules, studies have concluded that although the Colombian President has important constitutional powers, it is impossible to overcome the deadlocks generated by a system that promotes intra-party and inter-party competition. However, the Colombian Congress’s performance shows a certain level of organization and even efficiency in passing bills and getting through the legislative agenda. How can we explain this paradox? My proposal is that by taking into account the electoral rules, the internal rules of Congress and the power of the executive branch in imposing its preferences both in procedural and substantive matters, one can solve the paradox of the Congress performance and policy outcomes.
The period analysed, 1994-2000, covers two presidential periods after the Constitutional reform of 1991, and will contemplate both behaviour towards policy outcomes and procedural matters that account for the three main variables – the electoral rules, the internal rules of Congress and the resulting power from the executive- that account for the committees’ and legislators’ behaviour in the Colombian Congress.
